We show that the uniform validity is equivalent to the non-uniform validity for Blass' semantics of [A game semantics for linear logic. 
Japaridze's abstract resource semantics and intuitionistic logic
Sub-structural logics are often understood as logics of resources. Propositional variables mean certain types of abstract resources (rather than assertions, as in classical logic). Each occurrence of a variable p identifies one unit of a resource p. The connectives ∧ (multiplicative AND), ∨ (multiplicative OR), ⊓ (additive AND), ⊔ (additive OR), ¬ (negation), !, ? (exponential AND and OR) and 0, 1 (constants) have the following meaning. The expression x ∧ y means one unit of x and one unit of y (for example, x ∧ x is two units of the resource x). The expression x ⊓ y means an obligation to provide one unit of the resource x or one unit of the resource y where the consumer of resources (the user) makes the choice between x and y (for example, x ⊓ x is the same as x). The formula x ⊔ y means also an obligation to provide one unit of the resource x or one unit of the resource y. However, this time the choice between x and y is made by the provider (again x ⊔ x is the same as x).
What is the interpretation of ∨ (multiplicative OR)? Let us use the following metaphor. Assume that resources are coins of different types. Each occurrence of a variable x is regarded as a coin of type x. The coins can be genuine or fake, and the consumer cannot distinguish between genuine and fake ones. The expression x ∨ y is understood as a pair of coins, a coin of type x and a coin of type y, such that at least one of them is genuine (however, the user has no idea, which one).
The expression ¬x means the obligation of the user to pass to the provider one coin of type x (we can understand x also as the obligation of the provider to pass to the user one coin of type x). The formula ! x is understood as an infinite stock of genuine coins of type x. The expression ? x means an infinite stock of coins of type x such that at least one coin in the stock is genuine (and the user does not know which one). In other words ! x is a countable version of the multiplicative AND, x ∧ x ∧ x ∧ . . . , and ? x is a countable version of the multiplicative OR, x ∨ x ∨ x ∨ . . . .
The constants 0, 1 are understood as non-accomplishable obligations (tasks): 0 is the obligation of the provider and 1 is the obligation of the user.
In the next two sections we give a formal definition of a semantics which clarifies this intuition. From both the technical and philosophical viewpoints, this semantics coincides with Japaridze's "The logic of tasks" semantics defined in [5] and later extended to what has been termed abstract resource semantics in [8, 12] . What we call "a coin" is called "a task" in [5] and an "abstract resource" in [8, 12] . A genuine coin is a task accomplished by the provider. A false coin is a task that the provider failed to accomplish.
Syntax
Fix a countable set of variables x 1 , x 2 , . . . . A literal is a variable x i or a negated variable ¬x i . Formulae are obtained from literals, constants 1, 0 and connectives ∧, ∨, ⊓, ⊔, ?, ! in the usual way. We consider formulae where negations appear only in front of variables. When we write ¬A, we always mean the formula dual to A, that is, the formula which is obtained from A by changing each connective, each variable and each constant to its dual: ∨ ↔ ∧, ⊔ ↔ ⊓, ! ↔ ?, ¬x i ↔ x i and 1 ↔ 0.
The notion of a sub-formula of a formula A is defined in a usual way. Occurrences of a sub-formula B in A will be called oformulae. We define oliterals and ovariables in a similar way. If an ovariable is preceded by negation then it is called negative, otherwise positive.
Semantics
Each formula is assigned a two player game [A] of perfect information. The players are called Alice and Bob. A formula A will be called valid if Alice has a winning strategy in the game [A] .
First we replace in A each oformula of the type ! B by the infinite formula B ∧ B ∧ B . . . , and each oformula of the type ? B by the formula B ∨ B ∨ B . . . . It is easy to see that the order of replacements does not affect the result, which is an infinite formula of a finite depth.
In the game [A], the players make moves in turn. It does not matter who moves first. In his turn, Bob may perform any finite sequence a 1 , . . . , a k of actions (the sequence may be empty). Each action a i has the form "choose the left formula in B ⊓ C" or "choose the right formula in B ⊓ C", where B ⊓ C is an oformula of A. For each oformula B ⊓ C Bob may only once make an action "choose . . . in B ⊓ C", that is, he is not allowed to change the choices he has made.
In her turn, Alice may also perform any finite (possibly empty) sequence of actions. Each her action has one of the following two forms. (1) "Choose the left (right) formula in B ⊔ C" where B ⊔ C is an oformula of A. (2) "Allocate U to V ", where U is a negative occurrence of a variable x i in A and V is a positive occurrence of the same variable x i in A. The informal meaning of this action is that Alice wants to accomplish her obligation V using the coin U provided by Bob.
For each positive ovariable V Alice may perform at most one action of the form U → V , and for each negative ovariable U she may perform at most one action of the form U → V . In other words, actions of type (2) establish a matching between positive and negative ovariables that respects variables' names. Note that Bob is not allowed to make allocations. For each oformula B ⊔ C Alice may only once make an action of the type "choose . . . in B ⊔ C".
Each play consists of infinite (countably many) number of moves. When the play is finished, we define who has won as follows. Call a coin evaluation any mapping e from the set of all negative ovariables to the set {0, 1}. The informal meaning of a coin evaluation is the following: If e(U ) = 0 then the coin U provided by Bob is fake, otherwise (if e(U ) = 1) it is genuine. Given a coin evaluation e, we recursively extend e to all oformulae of A. We say that B is won by Bob, if e(B) = 0, and otherwise by Alice.
(1) If V is a positive ovariable, then e(V ) = 1, if for some negative ovariable U such that e(U ) = 1, in the course of the play, Alice has performed an action "allocate U to V ". The informal meaning: Alice has accomplished her obligation V if she has allocated a genuine resource U to it.
(2) If B is an occurrence of a negative literal ¬U , then Alice has won B iff e(U ) = 0. Thus ¬ acts as a classical negation. Rules (1) and (2) imply the following. If Alice has performed an action "allocate U to V " then exactly one of oformulae ¬U, V is won by Alice.
(3) Alice has won an oformula B ∧ C iff she has won both B and C. She has won an oformula B ∨ C iff she has won B or C.
(4) In a similar way we define who has won occurrences of ! B and ? B: an oformula B 1 ∧ B 2 ∧ B 3 . . . (we use subscripts to distinguish between different occurrences of B) is won by Alice iff she has won all oformulae B 1 , B 2 , B 3 . . . . An oformula B 1 ∨ B 2 ∨ B 3 . . . is won by Alice iff she has won at least one of oformulae B 1 , B 2 , B 3 . . . .
(5) Alice has won an oformula B ⊔ C iff, in the course of the play, she has decided between B and C in B ⊔ C and has won the chosen oformula. That is, she has performed the action "choose the left formula B ⊔ C" and she has won B, or she has performed the action "choose the right formula in B ⊔ C" and she has won C. If she has not decided between B and C then she has lost B ⊔ C.
(6) For an oformula of the form B ⊓ C the definition is similar (we swap Alice and Bob). Bob has won an oformula A ⊓ B iff in the course of the play, he has decided between B and C and has won the chosen oformula.
(7) Every occurrence of 0 is won by Bob and every occurrence of 1 is won by Alice.
Finally, we say that Alice has won the play iff for every coin evaluation e she has won the entire formula A. The informal meaning: Alice has accomplished the obligation A whatever coins Bob has used.
There is an equivalent way to define the result of a play. Call ovariables U and V matching if Alice has allocated U to V . Define an ovariable evaluation, as any mapping from the set of all ovariables to {0, 1}. Call e correct if e(U ) = e(V ) whenever U matches V . Alice has won a play if for every ovariable evaluation she has won the formula A according to the above rules (2)-(7). Indeed, the worst (for Alice) correct ovariable evaluation satisfies item (1) above anyway and thus can be identified by a coin evaluation.
In other words, to find who has won a play make the following steps. Replace by 0 all the oformulae of type B ⊔ C such that Alice has not chosen B or C. Replace by 1 all the oformulae B ⊓ C where Bob has not decided between B and C. Replace each remaining occurrence of a formula of the form B ⊔ C or B ⊓ C by the chosen subformula. (The order of replacements does not affect the result.) Then replace each ovariable by a new variable in such a way that matching ovariables are replaced by the same variables and non-matching ones by different ones. The resulting formula is an infinite formula of finite depth with connectives ¬, ∨, ∧ and constants 1, 0. Alice has won the play iff this formula is a classical tautology (where ∧ is understood as AND, ∨ as OR, and ¬x as the negation of x). The above described transformation is what is called elementarization in [5, 6, 14] .
Here is an example of play.
Initial position: ((¬x
2. Bob chooses the left formula in (¬x ∧ x) ⊔ y. The resulting position is (¬x ∧ x) ∨ ((x ∨ ¬x) ⊓ ¬y) (we have deleted the unchosen formula).
3. Alice chooses the left formula in (¬x ∧ x) ⊔ y. The resulting position is (¬x ∧ x) ∨ (x ∨ ¬x) (we have deleted the unchosen formula).
4. Alice allocates the first negative occurrence of x to the second positive occurrence of x. The resulting position is (¬x 1 ∧ x) ∨ (x 1 ∨ ¬x) (we have used subscripts to identify allocated ovariables).
5. Alice allocates the second negative occurrence of x to the first positive occurrence of x. The resulting position is (
6. Then the players make infinitely many passes.
Alice has won, as after elementarization we obtain a classical tautology (
The definition of the game [A] is completed. We call a formula A accomplishable 1 if Alice has a winning strategy in the game [A]. We call a formula A computably accomplishable if Alice has a computable winning strategy in the game [A] . The simplest accomplishable formula is x ∨ ¬x: in order to win Alice just allocates the second x to the first x.
If A has no exponential connectives then the game [A] is essentially finite (every player can perform only finitely many actions) and thus the game [A] is accomplishable iff it is computably accomplishable. In this case at least one of the players has a (computable) winning strategy. In the general case it is unknown whether accomplishability is equivalent to computable accomplishability.
Remark. It is important that Alice cannot distinguish fake and genuine coins. (Formally, that means that we choose a coin evaluation after the play is finished.) For example, the formula A = (¬x ∧ ¬x) ∨ x is not accomplishable. In the game [A] Alice has essentially two strategies: (1) she uses the first of Bob's coins (allocates the first x to the third x) (2) she uses the second one. Both strategies do not win. Indeed, if only one coin is genuine, namely, the coin that has not been allocated, Alice has lost the formula A.
The definition of an accomplishable formula is very robust: we can change the definition of the game in many ways so that the class of (computably) accomplishable formulae does not change. Below we present several such modifications.
1. We may forbid Alice (or Bob, or both) to perform several actions in one move. Indeed, postponing actions never hurts the player. By the same reason it does not matter who starts the play. 2. We may ban all actions inside oformulae B and C belonging to an oformula B ⊔ C (respectively, B ⊓ C) such that a choice action has not yet been applied to B ⊔ C (respectively, B ⊓ C).
3. We may assume that Bob must decide for every negative ovariable at the start of the game, whether it is genuine or false, but Alice does not know that decision. In this case the game [A] becomes a game of imperfect information. This change decreases Bob's power and there are formulae A for which Bob has a winning strategy in the game [A] before the change and has no winning strategy in [A] after the change. This happens, say, for the formula (¬x ∧ ¬x) ∨ x. The notion of accomplishability however does not change, as it is defined through Alice's strategies and not Bob's ones. 4 . We can define the game [A] recursively. To this end we need a notion of a "game with coins" and operations on such games that correspond to connectives.
Games of the form [A] can be regarded as vending machines: negative ovariables can be identified with slots for coins and positive ovariables with compartments for releasing the products. For instance, a vending machine that accepts 1 Euro coin and 50 cents coins and sells coffee and tea, for 1 Euro each, can be represented by the formula !(¬(1 Euro ⊔ (50 cents ∧ 50 cents)) ∨ (tea ⊓ coffee)).
Informally, the game [A] is accomplishable iff the vending machine can work without having any resources in advance.
Remark. The calculus CL2 found in [8] provides a sound and complete axiomatisation for the set of all accomplishable formulae that have no exponential connectives. It is unknown whether the entire set of accomplishable formulae is computably enumerable. The similar question is open for computably accomplishable formulae, too.
Accomplishable formulae and affine logic
Girard's affine logic [4] is a useful tool to prove accomplishability of many formulae. Consider the following its variant. A sequent is a finite list of formulae. A sequent consisting of formulae A 1 , . . . , A n is denoted by ⊢ A 1 , . . . , A n . The order of formulae in a sequent does not matter, but the multiplicity of each formula matters. That is, ⊢ p, p and ⊢ p are different sequents. A sequent ⊢ A consisting of a single formula A is identified with the formula A.
Axioms: ⊢ A, ¬A, ⊢ 1. We call corresponding ovariables dual. If U is a positive ovariable then its dual is negative, and vice versa. Alice allocates every negative ovariable in A ∨ ¬A to its dual ovariable. This is done in such a way that at the end of the game all the allocations have been made (say one allocation per move). Every occurrence of ⊔ (respectively, ⊓) in A ∨ ¬A is naturally assigned the "dual" occurrence of ⊓ (respectively, ⊔) in A ∨ ¬A. If Bob makes a choice in an oformula B ⊓ C then Alice (say, on the next move) makes the same choice in the dual oformula ¬B ⊔ ¬C. This strategy guarantees that for every ovariable evaluation Alice wins exactly one of the formulae A, ¬A and hence the entire formula A ∨ ¬A. . Now we will describe Alice's strategy more accurately. It is easier to do this assuming different rules of the game. It is not hard to see that the notion of accomplishability does not change, if we change the rules of the game as follows. Bob is allowed in his turn to make an action "deposit a coin in U " where U is a positive ovariable, and Alice is allowed to make an allocation U → V only after Bob has deposited a coin in U (that is, U is "non-empty"). Bob defines e(U ) immediately, when he deposits a coin in U (but Alice does not know e(U )). We will say that Bob has deposited a genuine coin in U if e(U ) = 1. If Bob has never deposited a coin into U then e(U ) = 0. The result of the play is defined as earlier using the coin evaluation defined in this way. In this proof we will use these rules. We will imagine that Bob makes a move "deposit a coin in U " by putting a real coin onto U and Alice allocates U to V by moving this coin to V . The position in the play is specified by the choices made by the players and locations of the coins, where for each coin sitting on a positive ovariable its previous location is specified. ′ ∨ c ′ and the resulting imaginary position is a ′′ . This description has an important drawback. What happens when S moves a coin from b to a, that is, from a negative ovariable U in B to a positive ovariable V in A, or in the other direction, from a negative ovariable V in A to a positive ovariable U in B? In the first case Alice moves the coin into the "temporary store" (later she will probably decide on which ovariable to put it). The locations in the temporary store correspond to ovariables in A. In the second case Alice takes the coin from the location U in the temporary store and puts it on V . Alice acts similarly when T moves coins from C to ¬A or in the other direction. When S (respectively, T ) moves a coin within A (respectively, ¬A), Alice moves that coin within the temporary store.
Thus Alice uses the "temporary store" while playing [B ∨ C]. It is clear that this does not increase her power. Indeed, instead of putting a coin into the temporary store she can wait until the coin will be taken back from the store. If the coin is never taken back, the coin is not moved at all from its original location.
We have to prove that this strategy wins. Let b ∨ c be the final position in the game [B ∨ C] and a the final position in the imaginary play. As S is a winning strategy, Alice has won b or a. In the first case we are done. Otherwise the strategy S has won the imaginary play, hence the strategy T has lost it. As T is a winning strategy, it has won c.
Introducing ∧: We (that is, Alice) are given strategies winning the games . We just apply the strategies independently. If the first strategy has won the formula A or the second strategy has won B, we are done. Otherwise the first strategy has won C and the second strategy has won D hence we have won the formula C ∧ D.
Introducing ∨: for this rule the formula image of the upper sequent coincides with the formula image of the lower sequent. Thus we have nothing to prove.
Introducing ⊓: We (Alice) are given strategies to win the games [A ∨ B] and [A ∨ C]. We have to design a strategy to win the game [A ∨ (B ⊓ C)]. We do not do anything until Bob makes a choice in the formula B ⊓ C. If that never happens, we have won. Otherwise we apply the first strategy, if Bob has chosen B and we apply the second strategy otherwise.
The first rule of Introducing ⊔: We (Alice) are given strategy that wins [A ∨ B]. To win [A ∨ (B ⊔ C)] we first choose B and then apply the given strategy. For the second rule the arguments are similar.
Weakening, Dereliction and Contraction: straightforward. R: We (Alice) are given a strategy S that wins the game [?
We can win this game by applying the strategy S ′ that consists of countable number of independent copies of S. A slight modification S ′′ of S ′ wins the game [? 
The affine logic is not complete with respect to the abstract resource semantics. An example of an accomplishable non-provable formula is
(This formula was used by Blass in [2] to show that the affine logic is incomplete with respect to his semantics.) We refer to [16] , where the reader can find a complete game semantics for the linear logic and references to other game semantics that are better tailored for the affine or linear logic.
We conclude this section by showing that the set of accomplishable formulae is closed under the substitution. We will need this later. , where we apply the strategy S. We copy to the real game all the choices and allocations made by S in the imaginary game except allocations involving the variable p. We also copy to the imaginary game [A] all Bob's choices made in the real game [A ′ ] outside occurrences of B. If in the imaginary play the strategy S allocates an occurrence U of p to an occurrence V of p, we declare the corresponding occurrences of B symmetrical. All pairs of symmetrical occurrences are synchronised : we mimic all Bob's choices made inside one of these occurrences in the other one. Notice that U is positive and V is negative, therefore we are able to do that. Besides, we allocate every negative ovariable in either of these occurrences to the dual positive ovariable in the other occurrence.
Theorem 2. Assume that a formula
Let us prove that this strategy wins. has won the oformula U ′ (the occurrence of B obtained by substituting B for U ). The defined evaluation respects matchings. Indeed, if U has been allocated to V then we have synchronised U ′ and V ′ and hence the results of U ′ and V ′ coincide. It is easy to show by induction that, for this pair of evaluations, the 3 more precisely, the player who has played U ′ in Alice's part result of the imaginary game coincides with the result of the real play. Since S is a winning strategy, we have won A and hence A ′ .
Accomplishable formulae and the intuitionistic propositional calculus IPC
Consider the Girard's translation from the language of propositional formulae with connectives ∧, ∨, →, ⊥ into the language of affine logic. Each formula A is assigned a formula A * defined recursively:
This translation preserves provability. The next lemma shows that the combination of this translation and abstract resource semantics yields a sound semantics for the intuitionistic calculus. Call an intuitionistic formula (computably) accomplishable if its translation is (computably) accomplishable.
Lemma 3. The set L of accomplishable intuitionistic formulae is a superintuitionistic logic (that is, L contains all axioms of IPC and is closed under Modus Ponens and substitution). The same holds for the set of all computably accomplishable intuitionistic formulae. Remark. If we defined the translation of A ∨ B as just A * ⊔ B * then the translation of the axiom
would not be accomplishable.
It turns out that this semantics of IPC is complete for the positive fragment of IPC.
Theorem 4. If A is a positive intuitionistic formula (that is, A does not contain ⊥) and A * is accomplishable then A is derivable in IPC.
One of the technical tools in the proof of this theorem is the following theorem, which was stated by Medvedev in [15] (without a complete proof) and proved in [3] . A critical implication is a (positive) formula of intuitionistic language of the form A 1 ∧ · · · ∧ A m → R, where R is an OR of variables and each A i has the form (P i → Q i ) → Q i . Here every P i is an AND of variables, every Q i is an OR of variables, and, for all i, the formulae P i and Q i have disjoint sets of variables. The number of variables in R, P i and Q i is positive and may be equal to 1.
Theorem 5 ( [15, 3] ). If a super-intuitionistic logic contains no critical implication then its positive fragment coincides with the positive fragment of IPC.
Proof of Theorem 4. We have seen (Lemma 3) that the set of accomplishable intuitionistic formulae is a super-intuitionistic logic. Thus by Theorem 5 it suffices to prove that every critical implication is not accomplishable. Let us show this first for a very simple critical implication 
We will present Bob's winning strategy in the game [B] . In this game he cannot make any actions, thus we need to prove that Bob wins the play whatever actions performs Alice. We distinguish two cases. Case 1 : Alice has not made any choice in the formula x ⊔ y. Then she has lost the entire formula, if all x's and all y's are true. Indeed, Bob has won the formula x ⊔ y. Moreover, he has won all oformulae (? ¬x ∨ y) ∧ ¬y and (? ¬y ∨ x) ∧ ¬x, since he has won all occurrences of ¬x and ¬y.
Case 2 : Alice has made a choice in x ⊔ y. Assume that she has chosen x (the other case is similar). Then she has lost the entire formula, if all x's are false and all y's are true. Indeed, Bob has won the formula x ⊔ y and all oformulae (? ¬x ∨ y) ∧ ¬y, as he has won ¬y. Besides, Bob has won all oformulae (? ¬y ∨ x) ∧ ¬x, as he has won ? ¬y ∨ x.
Consider now the general case. 
we may assume that R is an OR of all variables). The translation of
Recall that P i is an AND of variables and Q i is an OR of variables. Thus while playing [B] Bob is allowed to make choices in oformulae ¬Q * i for all i such that Q i has at least two variables. Fix any such oformula (?
We will show now that Bob wins. To this end define a correct ovariable evaluation as follows. If Alice has not made a choice in x 1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ x n then declare all ovariables true. Otherwise let x j be the chosen ovariable; declare all occurrences of x j false and all other ovariables true.
We have to prove that Bob has won the entire formula B. Consider the first case: Alice has not made a choice in x 1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ x n and all ovariables are true. In this case Bob has won the formula x 1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ x n . We have to prove that for all i he has won every occurrence of (? ¬P i . In this case she has won ? ¬P * i and we need to prove that Bob has won ¬Q * i . Bob has chosen some ovariable in ¬Q * i using either option (1), or option (2). As P i and Q i have disjoint sets of variables, x j does not occur in Q i and thus he has chosen an ovariable different from x j any way. Hence he has won ¬Q * i . (2) For every oformula ¬P * i Alice has not chosen x j in it. In this case Bob has won ? ¬P * i . If he has won Q * i , we are done. Otherwise Q i has a variable different from x j and Alice has chosen such variable in Q * i . Bob either has mimicked Alice's choice, or has chosen in ¬Q * i a variable different from x j by himself. Anyway he has won ¬Q * i . Theorem 4 does not generalise to negative formulae. We know two examples of a formula A such that A * is accomplishable but A is not provable in IPC: Rose formula from [18] and Japaridze's formula from [7] . The latter one is simple enough to present it here:
Here ¬B is an abbreviation for B → ⊥.
Theorem 6. The formula (1) is accomplishable but not derivable in IPC.
Proof. The counter Kripke model is shown on Fig. 1 . p,x p,y x y
It remains to prove that (1) is accomplishable. We will prove that a more general formula A = B → C where
The translation of A is equal to A * = ? ¬B * ∨ C * where
We will construct Alice's winning strategy in the game [? D ∨ C * ] which is even harder for her, where
is obtained from ¬B * by dropping ! in front of x, y, u, v. In the course of the play we call an occurrence of ¬x ⊓ ¬y in A * active if it is located inside an occurrence of D such that Alice has chosen the left formula !(¬p) * ∧ (¬x ⊓ ¬y) in that occurrence. In a similar way we define active occurrences of ¬u ⊓ ¬v. Alice does not make any choice in the formula C * until Bob has made a choice in some of active occurrences of ¬x ⊓ ¬y, ¬u ⊓ ¬v. This means that, until that moment, Alice and Bob are playing the game
As the formula defining this game is derivable in IPC, Theorem 3 implies that Alice has a winning strategy in this game. Alice plays according to this strategy until Bob has made a choice in some of active occurrences of ¬x ⊓ ¬y, ¬u ⊓ ¬v.
Assume that Bob has made choice in an active occurrence of ¬x ⊓ ¬y or an occurrence where he had made the choice earlier has become active (the case of ¬u ⊓ ¬v is similar). Once that has happened, Alice changes her behaviour. Assume that Bob has chosen ¬x (the other case is similar). Alice then "forgets" all the other occurrences of !(¬p) * ∧(¬x⊓¬y) and all the occurrences of !(¬¬p) * ∧ (¬u ⊓ ¬v) and chooses (¬p → x) * in C * . That is, starting from that moment Alice and Bob play the game [¬(¬p → x) * ∨ (¬p → x) * ]. The formula defining this game is accomplishable being an axiom of affine logic. Unfortunately Alice cannot immediately use the strategy winning this game, as some moves might have been already made inside occurrences of ¬p in
However it easy to overcome this problem. An infinite number of occurrences of ¬p in every occurrence of ? ¬p have not been yet allocated by Alice. Therefore the current position in the game ¬(¬p → x) * is not worse for Alice than the initial position.
2 The semantics of Japaridze's computability logic and accomplishability
Static games
We will use a rather general notion of games from [6, 14] between two players, called Environment and Machine. A move is a string over the keyboard alphabet. A labelled move (labmove) is a move prefixed by E or M (the prefix indicates who has done the move, Environment or Machine). A run is a finite or infinite sequence of labmoves. A position is a finite run.
A game 4 is specified by a set of runs L and a function W mapping runs to the set {E, M}. All runs in L are called legal, all other runs are called illegal. If W (Γ) = P , we say that the run Γ is won by P . Otherwise it is lost by P .
The set L must have the following properties: (1) the empty sequence (called the initial position) belongs to L and (2) if a (finite or infinite) run Γ is in L then all its finite prefixes are in L too.
Let Γ = α 1 , α 2 , . . . be a run and α i a labmove in that run. We say that α i is the first first illegal labmove in Γ if α 1 , . . . , α i−1 is legal run but α 1 , . . . , α i is not. Each illegal run Γ has exactly one first illegal labmove. The function W must have the following property: every illegal run is lost by that Player who has made the first illegal move in it.
We have not yet defined how to play a game. It is not obvious since in some positions both players can make a legal move and the rules do not specify who has the turn to play in such a position.
There are eight ways to play a game. We have to make three choices: who starts the game, how many moves (at most one or several) is Environment allowed to make in its turn, and how many moves (at most one or several) is Machine allowed to make in its turn. For example, the game can be played as follows: Environment starts the play; in its turn, each player either makes a move or passes. Another way: Machine starts the play; in its turn, Environment can make any finite sequence of moves (including the empty sequence); in its turn, Machine can make a move or pass. For all eight ways to play the game, we assume that the play lasts infinitely long and the turn to play alternates.
For certain games it is crucial which of the eight modes to play is chosen (for example, if W (Π) = E if Π starts with a move of E and W (Π) = M otherwise). There are however two important classes of games, strict games and more general static games, for which it does not matter.
A game is called strict if for every legal position ∆ at most one player can make a move α so that the resulting position (∆, α) is legal. Most games considered in the literature are strict ones. However, the operations on games we are going to define do not look natural when applied to strict games. They look natural when applied to more general static games defined in the next two paragraphs. Informally, static games are those games in which it never hurts the player to postpone moves.
Let Γ, ∆ be (finite or infinite) runs. We say that ∆ is a Machine-delay of Γ if ∆ is obtained from Γ by postponing certain Machine's moves (may be infinitely many). Formally, the following conditions should hold. (1) Erasing all moves of Environment in Γ and ∆ results in the same run; the same holds for erasing Machine's moves. (2) For all k and l if kth move of Machine is made later than lth move of Environment in Γ then so is in ∆.
We define a notion of Environment-delay in a similar way. We say that the game is static if the following holds for every player P , every run Γ and every P -delay ∆ of Γ. (1) If P has not made the first illegal move in Γ then P has not made the first illegal move in ∆ either. (2) If Γ is won by P then so is ∆.
We call a static game winnable if Machine has a winning strategy in the game. It does not matter which of the above eight ways to play the game to choose: the class of winnable static games is robust under switching between the eight playing modes. However, it is important that we do not force any player to make a move in its turn. We call a static game computably winnable if Machine has a computable winning strategy in the game (that is, there is a Turing machine that wins the game). Now we will define operations ¬, ∧, ∨, ⊔, ⊓, ∧ | , ∨ | on games. Those operation will preserve static property. We will then call a formula with connectives ¬, ∧, ∨, ⊔, ⊓, ∧ | , ∨ | winnable if every substitution of static games for variables results in a winnable game. It happens that that a formula is winnable iff it is accomplishable.
Operations on games
The operation of negation ¬ just swaps the roles of players: Machine plays in Environment's part and vice versa. The set of legal runs of ¬A is obtained from that of A by replacing each run Γ by its dual run ¬Γ, which is is obtained from Γ by exchanging labels E and M in all labmoves. Machine wins a run Γ in ¬A iff the dual run ¬Γ is won by Environment in A: W ¬A (Γ) = ¬W A (¬Γ) (where ¬M = E and ¬E = M).
The choice conjunction applied to games A, B produces the following game A ⊓ B. First, Environment decides between A and B. Then the chosen game is played. If Environment has not decided, it loses. Formally a non-empty run is legal iff it starts with Environment's move "choose left" or "choose right" and the rest of the run is a legal run of A if the first move is "choose left" and is a legal run of B if the first move is "choose right". A legal run is won by Machine in the following three cases: (1) it is empty, (2) the first move is "choose left" and the rest of the run is won by Machine in the game A, and (3) the first move is "choose right" and the rest of the run is won by Machine in the game B.
The choice disjunction A ⊔ B of A, B is dual to A ⊓ B. This time Machine has to decide between A and B (and it loses if it has not decided). In other words, A ⊔ B = ¬(¬A ⊓ ¬B).
Parallel disjunction ∨. In the game A ∨ B the players play two games A and B simultaneously. In order to win, Machine has to win at least one game. Formally, a run Γ is legal if the following holds. Let Γ i denote the result of removing from Γ all the labmoves that do not have the form P i.α (where P = E, M) and replacing the prefix P i.α by P α in all the remaining labmoves. A run Γ is legal if every its labmove has the form P i.α (where i = 1, 2) and the runs Γ Again players play infinitely many plays in the game A. However, this time in order to win, Machine has to win at least one play. That is, ∨ | A = ¬(∧ | ¬A). All these operations preserve the static property. However not all of them preserve strictness property. Consider, for example, the multiplicative conjunction. Assume that the games A and B are strict, the first move in A is made by Environment and the first move in B is made by Machine. Then the first move in A ∧ B can be made by either player. Nevertheless all eight ways to play A ∧ B are equivalent (for all strict games A, B). So we could fix any of the eight ways to play and thus convert A ∧ B into an equivalent strict game. However such stipulating would be quite unnatural (bureaucratic, using Japaridze's word). As a result, we would not have the property A ∧ B = ¬(¬A ∨ ¬B). The games A ∧ B and ¬(¬A ∨ ¬B) would be only equivalent in a sense.
Another reason to prefer static games is that all the computational problems can be quite naturally expressed as static games and not as strict games (see [14] for many examples). That is why Japaridze has chosen static games as a basis for his Game semantics.
Winnable = accomplishable
There is a similarity between operations on static games and abstract resource semantics. Consider, for instance, a formula A ⊔ B and a static game G ⊔ H. Machine has won G ⊔ H if it has made a choice between G and H and has won the chosen game. Similarly, Alice has won A ⊔ B if she has chosen between A and B and has won the chosen formula. The same holds for all connectives. The following lemma expresses this similarity in a rigorous form.
Let A(x 1 , . . . , x n ) be a formula and G 1 , . . . , G n static games. Substituting G i for x i in A and performing all operations spelled in A, we obtain a static game A (G 1 , . . . , G n ). Exponential AND and OR are interpreted as ∧ | , ∨ | respectively. Let R be a run in the game [A] and S a run in the game A(G 1 , . . . , G n ). Let P 1 .(choose B 1 ), P 2 .(choose B 2 ), . . . be the sequence of all the choice moves made in R. Call R and S similar if the sequence of all the choice moves in S is equal to P
. . , G n ) corresponding to the oformula B i and Alice ′ = Machine, Bob ′ = Environment. The following lemma is straightforward.
Lemma 7. Let R and S be similar runs. Consider the following ovariable evaluation: an occurrence of p i is true iff Machine has won the corresponding occurrence of G i .
5 Then Machine has won S iff Alice has won R for this evaluation.
We say that a formula A is winnable, if for all static games G 1 , . . . , G n the resulting game A(G 1 , . . . , G n ) is winnable. We say that A is computably winnable, if for all static games G 1 , . . . , G n the game A (G 1 , . . . , G n ) is computably winnable.
Consider also the uniform version of winnability. Call a formula A is uniformly (computably) winnable, if there is a (computable) strategy winning the game A (G 1 , . . . , G n ) for all static games G 1 , . . . , G n .
Every static game is equivalent to a strict game. Thus, in the definition of winnability we may restrict ourselves to strict games. On the other hand, if we consider only determined games 6 we obtain a weaker notion. Why? The class of determined games is closed under all operations considered. And who wins the game is determined just classically: Machine wins (i.e., it has a winning strategy in) A ∧ B iff it wins A and wins B, Machine wins A ∨ B if it wins A or wins B etc. Thus, if we restrict the class of static games to determined ones, a formula is winnable iff after dropping exponentials and identifying multiplicative and additive connectives it becomes a classical tautology.
For uniform winnability and computable winnability this is not the case. For example, it might be that Machine has a computable winning strategy in the game A ∨ B but does not have computable winning strategy in either A or B. Therefore for these versions of winnability it seems quite natural to restrict the class of games to determined ones. However, it turns out that this restriction does not affect the classes of uniformly winnable and uniformly computably winnable formulae. We do not know whether this is true for computably winnable formulae.
Theorem 8. The following three properties of a formula A are equivalent: (1) A is computably accomplishable, (2) A is uniformly computably winnable, (3) there is computable strategy that wins every game A (G 1 , . . . , G n ) where  G 1 , . . . , G n are 2-move 7 strict games.
Proof. 8 It is straightforward that (2) ⇒ (3). Proof of (1) ⇒ (2). Assume that Alice has a computable winning strategy S in the game [A] . We have to show that Machine has a computable winning strategy that wins every game of the form A(G 1 , . . . , G n ).
For every sub-formula B of A consider the "sub-game" B(G 1 , . . . , G n ) of A(G 1 , . . . , G n ). If B has the form C ⊔ D or C ⊓ D then every choice between C and D corresponds to a choice move between C(G 1 , . . . , G n ) and D(G 1 , . . . , G n ) in the game A (G 1 , . . . , G n ). Thus we have 1-1 correspondence between choice moves in the game [A] and choice moves in the game A (G 1 , . . . , G n ). To every occurrence p j k of the variable p k in A corresponds a sub-game G k of A(G 1 , . . . , G n ), which will be called G Hence, when the game is played, the run Γ m k is a Machine-delay of the run Γ j k . 7 We call a game a k-move game, if every legal run has at most k labmoves. 8 Morally, this proof is similar to soundness/completeness proof for system CL2 in [9] . Although the syntax of CL2 does not include parallel recurrences, those are long ∨, ∧ after all.
9 Formally, Γ m k and Γ j k are defined as follows. It is easy to extract from the current position in the game A(G 1 , . . . , Gn) the sequence of labmoves "made in G m k ". That sequence is Γ m k . To obtain Γ i k we first extract from the current position the sequence of labmoves ∆ made in ¬G j k and then let Γ i k = ¬∆.
We have to prove that the constructed Machine's strategy S ′ wins the game A (G 1 , . . . , G n ). Fix Environment's moves against S ′ . We obtain a run Γ ′ played against S ′ and the corresponding imaginary run Γ played against S. As S is a winning strategy, the imaginary run Γ is won by Alice. Therefore for every correct ovariable evaluation Alice has won the formula A.
Let us choose the following ovariable evaluation. Let Γ 
thus the ovariable evaluation is incorrect. But the incorrectness is in favour of Alice (as all connectives are monotone) and hence Alice has won A for this ovariable evaluation. By Lemma 7 Machine has won the run Γ ′ , and we are done. We will show now that, conversely, the negation of (1) implies the negation of (3). Let us fix a formula A(p 1 , . . . , p n ) which is not computably accomplishable and a computable Machine's strategy S. We have to define strict 2-move games G 1 , . . . , G n such that S loses the game A (G 1 , . . . , G n ). The first move x in all G 1 , . . . , G n must be made by Machine and the second move y must be made by Environment. Machine wins G i iff either it has made the first move but Environment has not made the second move, or both moves x, y has been played and the pair (x, y) belongs to a certain set W i . Thus we have to define W 1 , . . . , W n .
To every copy p j k of p k in A corresponds a game G k inside A(G 1 , . . . , G n ), which will be called G j k . We will fix now how Environment plays the games G j k against S. If p j k is negative then Environment has to make the first move in G j k and otherwise the second move. Anyway, once it should move it plays j in G j k (we identify strings over the keyboard alphabet and natural numbers). If there are infinitely many negative occurrences of p k , then Environment makes the moves in them in some order so that by the end of the play all these moves have been made (say at time j it makes the move in ¬G This strategy S ′ is computable. Therefore, Bob can play so that Alice has lost the game [A] . Fix such Bob's moves and make these moves against S ′ in the imaginary play. Mimicking them in the real play, we will obtain Environment's moves in A(G 1 , . . . , G n ).
It remains to define W 1 , . . . , W n . Fix a correct ovariable evaluation e such that Alice has lost the formula [A] . Let Γ . This shows that W 1 , . . . , W n are well defined. By Lemma 7 Machine has won A(G 1 , . . . , G n ) iff Alice has won A for this evaluation, and we are done.
In [6] Japaridze conjectures that computable winnability coincides with uniform computable winnability (Conjecture 26.1). In the preliminary version of this paper [17] we claimed, without a proof, that this conjecture is true. We have to admit that we have no valid proof for this. However, if we drop the computability requirement, then uniform winnability coincides with the nonuniform one. Proof. It is straightforward that (2) ⇒ (3) and (2) ⇒ (4). To prove the implication (1) ⇒ (2) recall the following. In the proof of the implication (1) ⇒ (2) from Theorem 8, we transformed every Alice's strategy S that wins [A] to a strategy S ′ that wins A(G 1 , . . . , G n ) for all static games G 1 , . . . , G n . (That transformation preserves computability, which does not matter any more.)
The proof of ¬(1) ⇒ ¬(4). In the proof of the implication ¬(1) ⇒ ¬(3) in Theorem 8 we have constructed a transformation S → S ′ from Machine's strategies in the game A (G 1 , . . . , G n ) to Alice's strategies in [A] that has the following property. If S ′ does not win A then there are 2-move strict games G 1 , . . . , G n such that S does not win A (G 1 , . . . , G n ). This shows ¬(1) ⇒ ¬(4).
The proof of the implication ¬(1) ⇒ ¬(3) is similar to the proof of ¬(1) ⇒ ¬(3) in Theorem 8. However, this time we have to beat uncountably many strategies (and not one strategy) and we need indetermined games G 1 , . . . , G n .
Assume that A is not accomplishable. We will define strict games G 1 , . . . , G n so that Machine has no winning strategy in the game A (G 1 , . . . , G n ). The turn of move in the games G 1 , . . . , G n will alternate, starting with Environment, say, and all moves made in turn will be legal. If the run is finite then it is lost by that player who has turn to move. Thus we have to define the value of winning functions W 1 , . . . , W n on infinite runs.
We will use diagonal arguments. There are continuum strategies in static games. Indeed, a strategy is a mapping from the set of all positions into to the set of all moves joint with "pass" (we assume the following playing mode: in its turn, each player either makes a move or passes). The set of all positions is countable, as a countable union of countable sets (for every fixed k, the set of all positions consisting of k moves is countable, as a product of countable sets). Finally, there are continuum mappings from N to N, as
Let us fix a 1-1 mapping from the ordinal c to the set of all strategies. The strategy assigned to α ∈ c will be called S α . We will use transfinite recursion on ordinals in c. On step α we will define Environment's moves against S α and we will define W 1 , . . . , W n on countably many runs. Thus, before step α, W 1 , . . . , W n will be defined on less than c runs.
Step α. As W 1 , . . . , W n have been defined so far on less than c runs, there is a sequence of moves a 1 , a 2 , . . . that has the following property. For all i ≤ n, W i has not been defined on any run of the form * , * , E.a 1 , * , E.a 2 , * , E.a 3 , * , . . . and on any run of the form * , * , * , M.a 1 , * , M.a 2 , * , M.a 3 , . . . . A(G 1 , . . . , G n ). In the copy G j k of G k Environment plays j and then a 1 , a 2 , . . . . This applies for both negative and positive occurrences of p k . By the choice of a 1 , a 2 , . . . , whatever moves Machine makes in G j k , the resulting run Γ j k either is finite (and hence lost by Machine), or it is infinite and W k has not been defined on Γ j k on previous steps. So we are free to define the value of W k on every infinite resulting run. The only constraint is that there might be collisions: a collision is a pair G (G 1 , . . . , G n ) we obtain Environment choice moves against S α . Thus all Environment's moves against S α are fixed. As the formula A has been lost by Alice, we can define W 1 , . . . , W n on all resulting runs so that Machine has lost A (G 1 , . . . , G n ). Notice that we have defined W 1 , . . . , W n on at most countably many runs.
We fix now Environment's moves in the game
A sequent is called (uniformly) (computably) winnable if so is its formula image. Theorems 8 and 9 show that winnability is a sound semantics for affine logic.
Theorem 10. The set of winnable sequents contains all axioms of the affine logic and is closed under all its derivation rules and under the substitution. The same applies to uniformly winnable sequents, computably winnable sequents, and uniformly computably winnable sequents. (Hence all derivable formulae are uniformly computably winnable.)
Proof. For winnability the statement is true, since winnability coincides with accomplishability. The same applies to uniform winnability and uniform computable winnability. For computable winnability this is proved similar to Theorems 1 and 2.
Remark. The soundness of affine logic with respect to computable uniform winnability (and hence all other sorts of winnabilities) was shown in [14] .
This theorem together with Theorem 4 and Lemma 3 show that winnability is a sound game theoretic semantics for intuitionistic propositional calculus, which is complete for its positive fragment.
Corollary 11. Let A be a formula in the intutionistic language. If A is provable in IPC then the formula A * is uniformly computable winnable. Conversely, if A is positive and non-provable in IPC then A * is not winnable and A * is not uniformly winnable for 2-move strict games (corollary of Theorem 9).
What about non-uniform computable winnability for k-move and determined games? The second item of Corollary 11 does not imply that there are determined games G 1 , . . . , G n such that the game A * (G 1 , . . . , G n ) is not computably winnable.
Theorem 12. If a positive formula A is not provable in IPC then there are determined static games G 1 , . . . , G n such that the game A * (G 1 , . . . , G n ) is not computably winnable.
Proof. Let L stand for the set of all formulae such that for all determined static games G 1 , . . . , G n the game A * (G 1 , . . . , G n ) is computably winnable. All operations on static games used in Girard's translation preserve determinacy. Thus L is a super-intuitionistic logic (the proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 3). By Theorem 5, it suffices to prove that L contains no critical implications.
Let A be a critical implication. We have to find determined static games G 1 , . . . , G n such that A (G 1 , . . . , G n ) is not computably winnable. All the games G 1 , . . . , G n will have the form "produce a binary sequence f ", where f : N → {0, 1}. More specifically, we will define sequences f 1 , . . . , f n and G i will be the following strict game: a run is legal in G i if it consists only of Machine's moves, a run Mx 1 , Mx 2 , . . . is won by Machine (that is, W i (x 1 , x 2 , . . . ) = M) if it is infinite and x t = f i (t) for all t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . Obviously, whatever functions f 1 , . . . , f n we choose later, the games G 1 , . . . , G n will be determined (won by Machine).
It is not hard to prove that there are functions f 1 , . . . , f n such that every f i is not Turing reducible to the tuple consisting of f 1 , . . . , f i−1 , f i+1 , . . . , f n . That is, there is no Turing machine that computes f i given an oracle that is able to compute all functions f 1 , . . . , f i−1 , f i+1 , . . . , f n . Fix such tuple of functions f 1 , . . . , f n .
The rest of the proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 4. That is, Environment applies Bob's strategy, as defined there. Besides it plays in the copies of games G 1 , . . . , G n as follows. In every sub-game of the form ¬G i (where Environment has to make moves) it plays f i (0), f i (1), . . . . It plays ¬G 1 , . . . , ¬G n in this way until Machine has made a choice in G 1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ G n . Starting from that time, it stops making any moves in all the sub-games ¬G j , where G j is the game chosen by Machine (and keeps playing in G i for i = j).
We will show now that Environment wins. Assume first that Machine has not made a choice in the game G 1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ G n . Then W 1 , . . . , W n evaluate to M on the runs in all copies of G 1 , . . . , G n that correspond to negative ocurrences of p 1 , . . . , p n . Even if W 1 , . . . , W n evaluate to M on all runs corresponding to positive ocurrences of p 1 , . . . , p n , Environment wins. Indeed, by Lemma 7 Machine has won the game A(G 1 , . . . , G n ) iff Alice has won the formula A for the similar run in the game [A] and for the evaluation that makes true all ovariables. As shown in the proof of Theorem 4, Alice has lost the similar run in the game [A] for this ovariable evaluation.
Assume that Machine has made a choice in the game G 1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ G n and has chosen, say, G j . Again W 1 , . . . , W n evaluate to M on the runs in all copies of G 1 , . . . , G j−1 , G j+1 , . . . , G n that correspond to negative ocurrences of p 1 , . . . , p n . Let us prove that W j evaluates to E on all the runs in copies of G j corresponding to positive copies of p j . Indeed, Environment has ceased to provide any information about f j . Thus Machine's playing G j can be viewed as a computation of f j with oracles for f 1 , . . . , f j−1 , f j+1 , . . . , f n . As any such computation makes an error, Machine has lost every positive copy of G j . Again by Lemma 7 and arguments similar to those from Theorem 4, Machine has lost the game A(G 1 , . . . , G n ).
Countable branching recurrence
There is another way to interpret exponential connectives as operations on games, called branching recurrence and corecurrence in [14] . There are two versions of them, countable and uncountable. Countable branching recurrence and corecurrence were essentially introduced by Blass in [1] . In the present form, they were defined in [13] .
The countable branching recurrence • | ℵ0 is the operation on games defined as follows. In the game • | ℵ0 A players play countably many plays in the game A and Machine has to win all plays (like in the game ∧ | A). However this time its job is even more difficult, as Environment may "copy" positions. Informally, we can imagine that a position in the game • | ℵ0 A is a tuple p 1 , . . . , p n of positions of A. The initial position is the tuple p 1 where p 1 is the initial position in A. If the current position is p 1 , . . . , p n , then each player is allowed to make a legal move in any of the positions p 1 , . . . , p n . Environment is also allowed to copy any p i , in which case the new position is equal to p 1 , . . . , p n , p i .
This definition is very informal because we have defined moves in terms of positions and not the other way around, as our framework prescribes.
Moreover, the described game may be not static. 10 To obtain an equivalent static game we need to understand a copying operation as splitting one position (the parent) into two new positions (the children). If a move made in a position P at time t is postponed to time t ′ > t and by the time t ′ the position P has been split, then that move is automatically played in all descendants of P . More specifically, we assign to each position an address, which is a binary string rather than a natural number. When a position with address w is split, the children positions get addresses w0 and w1. When a play is finished we obtain a finite or infinite tree consisting of all addresses used. All leaves in that tree are addresses of the played games. If the tree is infinite then some infinite paths are also addresses of played games: those infinite paths which have finite number of 1s. We will call such infinite binary sequences bounded.
Formally, a run Γ is legal if it is a sequence of labmoves of the form P w.α and E(split w) having the following two properties. (1) For every w and every proper prefix u of w every ocurrence of a labmove of the form P w.α or E(split w) in Γ is preceded by exactly one ocurrence of the labmove E(split u). (2) For every finite or infinite binary sequence w consider the sequence Γ(w) of all labmoves in Γ of the form P u.α-with "u." removed-where u is a prefix of w. For each finite or infinite w the run Γ(w) must be a legal run of A. A legal run Γ is won by Machine if Γ(w) is won by Machine for all leaves w and all bounded infinite branches w.
In the definition of uncountable branching recurrence • | , we stipulate that Γ is won by Machine if Γ(w) is won for all leaves w and for all infinite branches w (and not only bounded). Thus the difference between countable and uncountable versions is due to different understandings which plays in G have been played in the course of a play in • | G. respectively. We obtain new notions of winnability and computable winnability, which does not coincide with the old ones.
Lemma 13. The formula ?(¬x ⊓ ¬y) ∨ (! x ⊔ ! y), is (1) not winnable if exponentials are interpreted as parallel recurrence and corecurrence but is (2) uniformly computably winnable provided exponentials are interpreted as countable branching recurrence and corecurrence.
Proof.
(1) As winnability for parallel recurrence and corecurrence coincides with accomplishability, it suffices to prove that the formula is not accomplishable.
Here is Bob's winning strategy. Bob starts choosing ¬x in all occurrences of ¬x ⊓ ¬y (one choice per move). He goes on until Alice has made a choice in ! x ⊔ ! y. If Alice has chosen ! y, then she will lose the game, as Bob can declare all y's false and all x's true. Otherwise (if Alice has chosen ! x), Bob stops choosing ¬x in remaining oformulae ¬x ⊓ ¬y and starts choosing ¬y instead. Again Bob has won, as he can declare true all ovariables he has chosen and declare all others false. 
Uncountable branching recurrence
Theorem 17 is true for uncountable branching recurrence as well, which was shown in [11] . Our proof of Theorem 17 (based on Theorem 5) also works for uncountable branching recurrence and corecurrence and provides a shorter proof than that of [11] .
